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Novel Biosecurity Threats

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THANK YOU




WHAT I WANT YOU TO KNOW

- Biosecurity is a unique subset of the security discipline
- Biosecurity has local and global implications
- Information gap is closing rapidly = Threats are growing rapidly
- Negligent researchers, malicious insiders, and curious do-gooders are equal threats
- Biosecurity is a field that needs codification and unification across science, security, public health, and health security

WHO AM I?

- **Biochemist & Geneticist**
- **Biosafety and biosecurity practitioner**
- **Public health sympathizer**



TERMINOLOGY

- **Biosafety**- a set of practices and principles in the laboratory to mitigate exposure to infectious agents
- **Valuable Biological Materials (VBM)**- materials of biological origins (DNA, cells, biotherapeutics, etc.) that have financial value
- **Select Agents**- Biological agents (bacteria, viruses, fungi, toxins) that are regulated by USG

WHAT IS BIOSECURITY?

- Several definitions relating to 1) agriculture, 2) genetically modified organisms, and 3) infectious agents

“laboratory biosecurity...[as the] institutional and personal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release of pathogens and toxins.”


World Health Organization. Laboratory Biosafety Manual, 3rd Ed.



PART ONE


- **The Science of Biological Risks, Threats, & History**
 - *How understanding the asset drives risk and threat management*

THE SCIENCE OF BIORISKS & THREATS



<https://arstechnica.com/science/2014/11/understanding-the-ebola-virus/>

- **Ebola virus disease (EVD)**
 - RNA virus (very sneaky)
 - Ingestion, subcutaneous, mucous membrane
 - No known cure



https://microbewiki.kenyon.edu/index.php/Bacillus_Anthraxis_NEU2011

- ***Bacillus anthracis***
 - Spores last years, germinate upon host entry
 - Causative agent of Anthrax toxin
 - Inhaled, ingested, subcutaneous

THE SCIENCE OF BIORISKS & THREATS



<http://uasr.agropedias.iitk.ac.in/content/anthrax-disease-and-its-management-sheep-and-goat>



<http://www.foxnews.com/health/2016/11/03/ebola-adapted-to-target-humans-during-2014-outbreak-study-finds.html>

- Both EVD and Anthrax (and many others) are found in nature:
 - Cannot secure the environment
 - Zoonotic (animal to human transmission)
 - Local outbreaks often unpredictable
 - The information gap is closing- no longer have to raid a lab
 - Can't be rapidly detected with mechanical devices or “sniffers” (some exceptions)


BRIEF HISTORY OF BIOWEAPONS



- Ancient aboriginal people (South America) used darts laced with poisons from plants and animals.
- In 1346, Tartar forces catapulted plague-infected bodies into the Genoese trading post, Caffa. As the Genoese fled to Genoa/Europe, likely carried *Y. pestis* throughout Europe = “Black Death.”

BRIEF HISTORY OF BIOWEAPONS

- 1763, Pontiac Rebellion, Native Americans dissatisfied with British, formed rebellion. British presented Delaware Indians with blankets contaminated with smallpox virus.



- 1865 - Dr. Luke Blackburn accused of attempting to weaponize yellow fever

BIOSECURITY TODAY

- 2001 - U.S. Patriot Act - introduced mechanism for laboratory accountability
- 2002 - Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act and Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act - introduced “security risk assessment”
- 2015 - White House releases “Memorandum on Biosafety and Biosecurity Measures”
- ***But what effect does this have on surveillance, outbreak response, and the common laboratory?***

IN THE LABORATORY



Research, Hospitals, Clinical, Diagnostic, Public Health Labs:

- Maintain countless samples of infectious agents
- Most have developing (or robust) biosafety programs
- Most have fundamental security programs
- ***So why all the concern?***

BIOSECURITY IS UNIQUE

- Assets (biological materials) are microscopic- difficult to detect
- They reproduce under the right conditions- only need to remove a miniscule amount
- Protection so far has been the knowledge necessary to work with them...



PART TWO

- **Infectious Agents are Old but Things Are Changing**
 - *What is occurring that makes biologicals a growing concern*

WHAT'S CHANGING?

- Information gap is closing
- Access is increasing
- Developing technologies are an unknown
- Climate change
- Lack of policy
- Organized threats
- Drug resistance
- Depleted antibiotic platform
- Emerging infectious disease



<http://www.bugsonline.org/>

AND THE WORLD HAS CHANGED




"It's very hard to rate the probability of bioterrorism but the potential damage is very huge," Gates said during a panel at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/19/bill-gates-bioterrorism-damage-could-be-very-huge.html>

- Terrorism
- Industry Competition
 - Insider Threats
 - Negligence
 - QA/QC

THERE WILL BE WINNERS AND LOSERS




<http://www.usatoday.com/topic/9ee9e5de-b702-4fbc-9e5d-1b595adcf938/biolabs/>

- Losers are not always in the wrong
- Mass casualty via disease not the only outcome
 - Reputational risk

THE INFORMATION GAP IS CLOSING

- Like IT, biological sciences are becoming more accessible and “friendly”
- What used to require a Ph.D. can be found through open channels



ACCESS IS INCREASING

- Community Labs are on the rise
- Equipment and reagents can be ordered online

Membership

Join Our Community of Biohackers

Monthly membership unlocks:

BSL1 lab, co-working space and shared equipment
Class and event discounts
Storage space in lab fridge, chemical cabinet and freezer
Free safety training & orientation
Office space with appointment

[LEARN MORE](#)




[Biocurious.org](https://biocurious.org)



TECHNOLOGY IS ADVANCING

- Gene editing, gene synthesis, synthetic biology = new tools
- Virtually no regulations (think “smallpox”)



<https://www.aati-us.com/instruments/fragment-analyzer/crispr/>

ORGANIZED THREATS ARE MOBILIZING

The Telegraph

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Islamic State seeks to use bubonic plague as a weapon of war

Islamic State research into biological and chemical weapons uncovered on seized laptop to target shopping centres and air-conditioning systems



- Terrorist groups known to invest in bioweapons research and production
- Taken together (shrinking information gap, greater access, outbreak hotspots, new technology) this is a huge concern


OTHER CHALLENGES

- Climate change is creating new “zones” for emerging disease
- Virtually no regulations outside of BWC
- Global infrastructure to respond is low
- And new infectious agents continue to be discovered
- *Is the point coming through?*

PART THREE


- **Threats to the Lab and the Outbreak**
 - *Why threat management needs to learn biology*

IDEALLY: BIOSAFETY & BIOSECURITY



Adapted from: *Biosecurity: Understanding, Assessing, and Preventing the Threat*. R. Burnette (Ed). Wiley. 2013

REALITY: BIOSAFETY & BIOSECURITY



LABORATORY ENVIRONMENT

- Mixed levels of technical expertise (student, manager, technician, management, administration, EHS, security, emergency response, HR)
- Wide distribution of demographics, national origin
- Are a workplace
- Maintain stores of infectious agents
- Pressure to produce and publish

LAB INSIDER THREATS

- Malicious



- Negligent



- Benevolent



LAB INSIDER THREATS

- **Malicious**

- Graduate student not having good luck
- For months, no project works for anyone
- Caught spiking lab-grade, shared water supply with bleach
- Financial loss in excess of \$60,000



LAB INSIDER THREATS

- **Malicious**

- Yale University veterinary technician
- Pled guilty to murdering grad student Annie Le in 2009
- Frequently complained about animal welfare



LAB INSIDER THREATS

- **Negligent**
 - Graduate student working with regulated biological material
 - Transport of materials in lab coat pocket
 - Takes lab coat home to wash
 - Samples transported out of lab accidentally



Holy crap!



LAB INSIDER THREATS

- **Benevolent**
 - Dr. Klaus Nielsen: Well-respected Canadian scientist stole samples of *Brucella*
 - Intent was to develop cheaper diagnostic kits for China and others



<http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/no-jail-for-scientist-who-tried-to-smuggle-deadly-bacteria-defence-argues>

LAB INSIDER THREATS


- **Benevolent**

- Canadian Food Inspection Agency suffers reputational losses
- Licensed competitor reported losses
~\$10,000,000



OUTBREAKS: THREAT MANAGEMENT

- Aum Shinrikyo cult/ terrorist organization has a history with EVD
- 1992, sent 40 medical personnel to Zaire to support local EVD outbreak
- Tried to obtain EVD samples
- Ultimately failed



OUTBREAKS: THREAT MANAGEMENT

- The Challenge: how do you institute TM practices when you have a widespread medical emergency?
 - *Today, Doctors Without Borders still does not have an accurate account of how many frontline medical workers they sent to West Africa in 2014-15*



<http://www.nationalturk.com/en/ebola-panic-in-west-africa-death-toll-of-ebola-reaches-328-in-republic-of-guinea-breaking-news-51329/>

OUTBREAKS: THREAT MANAGEMENT


- The Challenge: how do you institute TM practices when you have a widespread medical emergency?
 - *Tons of infectious waste say unattended for weeks waiting for incineration.*



<https://noharm-global.org/articles/news/global/gghh-webinar-series-free-webinar-ebola-and-health-care-waste-lessons-west>

OUTBREAKS: THREAT MANAGEMENT

- The Challenge: how do you institute TM practices when you have a widespread medical emergency?
 - *Everyday, there are dozens of reported or emerging “hotspots” of dangerous infectious disease.*



www.oie.int

THE REALITY

- We will likely never truly secure outbreak incidents.
- *But what can be done?*

ADAPTING THE 5 PILLARS

| Pillar | Laboratory | Field |
|--------------------|--|--|
| Physical | Locks, doors, fences, biometrics | Zoning and compartmentalization, facility-level biosecurity; movement controls; wildlife controls; trespassing |
| Information | Firewalls, IT systems | Reporting access, comms., info sharing and dissemination; joint training across disciplines |
| Material | Inventory mgmt., access control | Waste mgmt. in EVD outbreak; access to infectious waste; carcass management |
| Personnel | Background checks, screening, observation, reporting, training | Lack of education, training, experience, credentialing, “disease discrimination” |
| Transport | Licensing, training, regulations | Movement controls (samples, infected), trade restrictions; zoning |

PART FOUR

- **How to Move Forward**
 - *Biosecurity for Security Professionals*

BIOSECURITY: THREAT MANAGEMENT

- **Threat management** = implementation of control measures to minimize, mitigate and manage threats & hazards
- **Biosecurity** = implementation of control measures necessary to minimize threats, and safeguard, biological agents/VBM




BIOSECURITY: THREAT MANAGEMENT

- When you build Biosecurity, you're building TM
- Again, based on TA and VA, integrated with RA


- **Components:**

- *Administrative controls*
 - Policy statement
 - Program plan
 - SOPs
- *Training and drills*
- *Personnel suitability and reliability*
- *Material control and accountability*
- *Management and implementation*




BIOSECURITY: IMPLEMENTATION

- **Implementation begins with knowledge**
 - Biosafety personnel need to understand security/ threat management
 - Threat management professionals need to understand biological assets intrinsic attributes



BIOSECURITY: IMPLEMENTATION



synbiobeta



INTERPOL



PROFESSIONAL CREDENTIALING



- Registered Biosafety Professional
- Certified Biological Safety Professional



- Certified Threat Manager



PART FIVE

- **Summary**
 - *What can we do?*

SUMMARY

- Biosecurity is distinct from biosafety, and traditional security, rooted in threat management
- Convergence of factors makes this “when,” not “if”
- Labs and outbreaks are at risk
- No definition of a “Biosecurity Professional”
- ***It's time to talk***

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

- AETAP
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Go Raibh Maith Agat

“May you have goodness”



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