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## NEWSLETTER

2023



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**MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT**

Dear AETAP Members

Dear colleagues

Dear all

Meteorological spring is just around the corner in Europe and many people are looking forward to the first picnics with friends outdoors after the long Corona break. Many others are experiencing the worst days of their lives right now, worrying about their loved ones lost in the war and literally fighting for survival on a daily basis. Others have been protesting for months against an oppressive and inhumane system and perhaps are secretly letting their hair flutter in the spring breeze right now. It is an intense time with many questions and uncertainties that affect us all in different ways - whether as observers, those affected or those professionally involved. It is precisely in these times that the discipline of threat management represents an opportunity to create safety on a selective and networked basis. With the 14th AETAP Conference, we are once again cultivating this network together with physical meetings. We are very happy about this and even more pleased that we can host the first conference after the Corona break in Nuremberg, Germany; Nuremberg - the city of human rights. A wide range of excellent speakers will join us in making a statement for more safety and humanity - please join us.

Until the conference, we wish you an interesting read of the newsletter with lots of news and exciting background information.

Andrea Wechlin, AETAP President

Karoline Roshdi, AETAP Vice-President

**CONFERENCE PROGRAM 2023**

Registration for our 14<sup>th</sup> conference is still open. Please have a look at our program, practical information and sign up to share the latest insights in our field of Threat Assessment and Management here: [14th AETAP Conference - AETAP - Association of European Threat Assessment Professionals](#). On top of the two-day conference, 'newcomers' are more than welcome to follow an introduction in our field. This core competence day will cover the following topics: The method we work with (Structured Professional Judgment); Information gathering and interviewing techniques; Domestic violence, Stalking and Threat Management principles. Parallel to this basic introduction experienced TAM-colleagues are invited to our expert day:



***“Anonymous threatening communications” by Bram van der Meer, Pippa Gregory and Niall Burns***

The threat assessment field has spent the last couple of decades developing processes so that we can recognise, evaluate and mitigate the risk of harm when threats of violence are made. These processes, many of which have been derived from empirical and clinical research, have been established within the operational context in order that we can make reasoned judgements about how best to manage the risk that an individual poses. We also often have the benefit of being able to rely on risk assessment or Structured Professional Judgement tools which prompt us to consider the relevant factors in the threatener's background, help us identify how far they have progressed along threat pathways and signpost us to the presence of warning behaviours. But what happens when we don't know who is making the threat? How can we evaluate how dangerous an unknown individual is, assess how likely they are to carry out or escalate their threats, or know how we can make them stop? What factors should we (or could we) rely on when it comes to assessing the risk posed by an invisible identity? And how can we find out who they are?

These questions, among others, will be addressed during AETAP's Expert Training Day on anonymous threatening communication (ATC). Through a combination of training delivery, interactive workshops, and case study presentations, attendees will be encouraged to consider the hidden factors within ATC which can shine some light on this challenging assessment process. The importance of a holistic approach with input from a range of specialisms including psychology, intelligence and security, will be highlighted and the different opportunities/challenges which present themselves across the different threat working environments will be explored. Exciting progress in the development of an ATC SPJ tool will also be discussed.

***“Terrorist decision making” by Professor Paul Gill***

On the evening of March 17<sup>th</sup>, and early hours of March 18<sup>th</sup> 2017, Ziyed Ben Belgacem partied. Toxicology reports later identified a blood alcohol level almost twice the legal driving limit as well as signs of cannabis and cocaine. Belgacem, a prolific criminal, drove home. On his way, he encountered three police officers at a checkpoint. When they requested his identity papers, Belgacem fired a pellet gun at them, injuring one. From there, he went to a nearby café, threatened a hostage-taking scenario “in the name of Allah” and fired his pellet gun 12 times. He then hijacked a car and drove to Paris Orly airport. On his way, he called his father to say he “screwed up.” Inside the airport terminal, he walked behind a three-person military patrol, grabbed one soldier,



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held her at gunpoint, wrestled her assault rifle away and said, “I’m here to die for Allah...people are going to die”. In the ensuing struggle, her colleagues shot Belgacem dead before he could enact the second part of his stated intention.

Terrorist attacks like this appear to run counter to the limited body of literature on terrorist decision making which outlines that terrorist attacks typically derive from a rational process involving a sequence of purposeful and observable behaviours (see Gill et al., 2020). No matter how irrational the ideological system or grievance driving the violence, the behaviours in the build-up, it is argued, are typically very rational. The evidence suggests decisions about when, where, and how to carry out a particular attack derive from simple cost-benefit analyses, drawing on prior experience, acquired knowledge (from a variety of sources including but not limited to online research, site visits and insider knowledge) and information in the immediate attack situation. This is said to hold true for both highly complex attacks and primitive low-tech incidents, as well as more mundane criminal offender decision-making more generally.

However, Belgacem's attack unfolded quickly from an inconspicuous unanticipated interaction with police. This left little, if any, time for considering the pros and cons of different potential targets, or the efficacy of the final attack site's protective security measures. No purposive hostile reconnaissance occurred. The volume of behaviours associated with attack planning and preparation pale in comparison to other in-depth case studies such as the Little Rock military recruitment centre shooting (Gartenstein-Ross, 2014), the Frankfurt Airport shooting (Böckler et al., 2015), the Berlin Christmas market vehicle attack (Böckler et al., 2017), Anders Breivik's coordinated bombing and shooting attacks (Hemmingby & Bjorgo, 2018), the Boston marathon bombing (Cotti & Meloy, 2019), the Christchurch Mosque shootings (Veilleux-Lepage et al., 2020), the Florida incel attack (Collins & Clark, 2021), and the Mascerata shooting (Marone, 2022).

The richness of such case studies makes a compelling argument about the cold calculated purposive methodical behaviour underpinning a terrorist attack. However, as the Belgacem case suggests, this sweeping conclusion might result from a researcher selection effect whereby only highly planned and thus informationally abundant attacks get sufficient scientific attention. On the other hand, less planned and seemingly spontaneous terrorist attacks avoid scrutiny, thus potentially leading to short sighted conclusions. By only focusing on those few attacks that leave behind lengthy considerations of an attack's performance, we overlook other critical cases.




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At the AETAP conference, Professor Gill will present his analysis of a bespoke dataset that covers the universe of successful, foiled, and disrupted attacks that occurred between January 2010 and December 2021 in Northwest Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. The database focuses on a range of behavioural data related to the planning and execution of each plot as well as a smaller number of offender-relevant characteristics. Via a range of bivariate and multivariate analyses, his team develop a terrorist typology which helps provide insight into the variance in attack planning noted above. The presentation will conclude by considering the utility of this operationalisation from a conceptual and tactical standpoint. It argues for a slightly different characterisation of terrorist decision making, and makes the argument for a more closely aligned approach to the environmental criminology paradigm which suggests additionally focusing upon the interaction of crime events and individual capabilities, and the social and behavioural qualities of the offense.

**AETAP-MEMBERSHIP**

Having established ourselves in 2006, AETAP has been steadily growing its membership over the last 17 years. We now have over 80 members and thought it might be of interest to reflect on who we are as a community, where we are based, and in what areas we may be under-represented.

AETAP members are most affiliated to Germany (21.5%), Switzerland (20.3%), the United Kingdom (13.9%), Sweden (12.7%) and the Netherlands (8.9%). We have members in other central European and Scandinavian countries, but no footprint in Southern or Eastern Europe. Incoming AETAP President, Raoul Jaccard, has laid out his intention to increase the Spanish and French contingent in the next few years, and would be delighted to see other European countries represented to ensure we are meeting the needs of the entire European threat community.







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We also have a small number of AETAP members from outside of Europe; all are very welcome!

Perhaps unsurprisingly within a contemporary threat assessment and management community, males appear to be over-represented in the AETAP membership; we have an approximately 3:2 split of males to females.



AETAP is a diverse community in terms of the organisations with which our members are affiliated. The majority of members (over half) work within the private sector. They are most commonly employed within corporate organisations, e.g., as security- or risk management experts, compliance officers or HR

professionals, or within private consultancies offering their risk assessment/management services to a range of clientele. We have almost 40% of members working within the criminal justice sector - in police/law enforcement agencies or prison/probation services, most of whom are psychologists, analysts or serving officers. We also have 10% of members working within other areas of the public sector or government agencies, including colleagues from within academia.

We are proud to have a diverse group of members and look forward to welcoming more to our community soon. An AETAP-member receives several benefits, such as the Journal of Threat Assessment and Management (JTAM) for free, discount on TAP-conferences and receiving this annual newsletter directly in your inbox. Please inform your colleagues in the field about the existence of AETAP, the advantages of becoming a member and our annual conferences.

**PUBLISHED RESEARCH**

It seems that the many weeks and months of Corona lockdowns have given rise to a wealth of available research. Many academics and practitioners appear to have



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turned the hours locked away at home to their advantage, writing and then submitting papers to journals for publication. The field of threat assessment and management was no exception to this and we have selected a few recently published papers in four areas to share with you.

**Linguistics**

There is growing recognition of the relevance and benefits of studying the language of threat when attempting to understand, assess and manage targeted violence. Linguistics is the scientific study of language and its structure, including grammar, syntax and phonetics. A number of linguists are now applying their skills and expertise within the threat assessment field.

Last year, an international team of linguists joined forces with psychologists to examine the language of transnational far-right terrorists. They explored the intertextuality of 10 lone actors who had shared their world view through targeted violence manifestos, live-streams, announcements on digital platforms and writing on weapons/equipment used in their attacks. The study examined the contagion and copycat effect resulting from these communications and noted their interconnectivity across five stages which correspond to the pathway of intended violence, e.g., perpetrators studying other actors targeted violence manifestos during self-radicalization, researching other actors' communication for tips whilst planning and preparing their own attacks, and composing their own manifestos during the mobilization stage. They also identified content patterns across the various forms of communication within their sample including copying structural components and phrasing from previous manifestos within their own, thanking their followers or other users for their support when announcing the attack on digital platforms, and encouraging others to raise awareness about their attacks by disseminating copies of their manifestos and/or sharing their livestreams.

This fascinating paper argues that the actors' language accentuates the complex extreme right online ecosystem which "empowers copycats and escorts them on their pathway to violence". For more information see: Kupper, J., Christensen, T.K., Wing, D., Hurt, M., Schumacher, M. & Meloy, R. (2022). The Contagion and Copycat Effect in Transnational Far-right Terrorism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 16(4), 4-26. (<https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/binaries/content/assets/customsites/perspectives-on-terrorism/2022/issue-4/kupper-et-al.pdf>). The lead author of this paper, Julia Kupper, will be providing an introduction to forensic and tactical linguistics at our forthcoming conference.

In Predicting Author Profiles from Online Abuse Directed at Public Figures (*Journal of Threat Assessment & Management*. Doi: 10.1037/tam0000172, <https://psyarxiv.com/xdqs9/>) Isabel van der Vegt, Bennet Kleinberg and Paul Gill explored the relationship between



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neutral and abusive language and the demographics of the authors who wrote it, and then used a machine learning approach to predict personality, age and gender on the basis of language presented in the texts. Statistically significant relationships were found between demographics (personality and gender) and various linguistic measures. For example, males were found to have used more analytical language across both sets of texts whereas females used more pronouns, personal pronouns and apostrophes; males also used more sexual words in the abusive texts, whereas women used more social words. Language use in abusive texts was also found to be associated with emotionality, openness and psychopathy score, whereas neutral text evidenced associations with emotionality, extraversion and openness. However, these statistical effects did not translate well to predictive ability compared to previous studies. The authors therefore recommended that further research should be conducted in author profiling within the threat assessment field.

Linguistics is clearly an exciting field with much to promise threat management practice. The authors of the second paper have, however, also published cautionary advice in relation to managing our expectations of computational linguistic, i.e., using automated, computer science techniques to analyse language. In a further paper, they highlight a number of challenges, as well as opportunities, that are raised when computational analyses are applied to linguistic data within threat assessment, and they propose a useful mnemonic – VISOR-P (validity, indicators, scientific quality, openness, relevance, performance) – which serves as a checklist for assessing the validity of tools which purport to offer such assessments. They conclude by stressing the utility of computational linguistics in the *measurement* of threat, rather than its *prediction*, and the importance of hybrid decision-making, i.e., it's fine to rely on computational tools to identify linguistic patterns that could otherwise remain hidden, but we have to ensure that the final judgment regarding risk is always made by the human professional.

For more information see: Van der Vegt, I., Kleiberg, B. & Gill, P. (2022). Proceed with Caution: On the Use of Computational Linguistics in Threat Assessment. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*. DOI: 10.1080/18335330.2023.2165137. <https://psyarxiv.com/nca9d/>

**Stalking - the SAM**

Threat assessment practitioners are well versed in the benefits of Structured Professional Judgment (SPJ) tools when making comprehensive risk assessments and managing threat. The Guidelines for Stalking Assessment and Management (SAM) and the Stalking Risk Profile (SRP) are recognized SPJ tools within the domain of stalking, with



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SAM often being applied within a policing or investigative context and SRP more so within the clinical domain. The ability of SAM to predict stalking recidivism was the subject of two academic papers published last year; one by a team from the USA who assessed its ability to predict recidivism in a forensic population of stalkers when utilized by a team of senior forensic psychology graduates; and one by a research duo who assessed its application by Swedish operational police officers.

It should be recognized that SAM, as a SPJ tool, is not an actuarial risk assessment tool; that is, we cannot simply add up the number of individual factors and expect those with the highest number of factors present to represent the greatest risk. Despite this, both papers tested the predictive validity of individual (and collective) SAM factors and came up with differing results. The USA study was largely supportive of the factors as predictors of future stalking with 16 factors being found to have significant positive associations with recidivism, the majority of which fell within the Nature of Stalking domain. The Swedish study, however, found that recidivism was significantly correlated with Perpetrator risk factors only, but these had poor-to-acceptable discriminatory ability in relation to predictive validity. Both studies also tested the predictive validity of the final risk assessment rating for future stalking (one of the Conclusory Opinions which the assessor determines using, among other things, the SAM factors) and neither of them found evidence that these ratings were significantly associated with recidivism.

The two papers presented different methodologies including different samples of both stalkers and assessors, and different measures for assessing predictive validity. It is therefore not particularly constructive to simply compare the results of their findings in this short review. However, when taken collectively, these two studies appear to offer some common learning and perhaps some useful reminders regarding the use of SPJ tools:

- SAM requires training in the tool as well as a foundation in domain knowledge in order to be successfully applied as a stalking risk assessment guideline; it can only ever really be as good as the practitioner who is using it. We must therefore ensure that those who are tasked with using it are thoroughly educated in its application, are aware of its limitations and are competent professionals within the stalking field.
- Both studies were fairly novel in having relatively long follow-up periods during which time recidivism could be assessed. However, they both appear to have relied on a static risk assessment rating. We must be cognisant that risk factors will fluctuate over time and we should therefore not expect to be able to rely on a one-moment-in-time risk rating to predict future stalking or related events years ahead. The assessment and subsequent management of risk must be an ongoing process in order to remain effective.



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- There is a growing appetite for further research in this area and both studies identified a number of potential areas of focus, including: longitudinal studies with repeated risk assessments at various timescales; evaluation of practitioners' application of the tool, i.e., how do they use it routinely within the operational context and how do they formulate the risk rating (Conclusory Opinions); exploring further the correlations between risk assessments and management strategies; and considerations of whether recidivism was targeted at the same (persistent) or different (serial) stalking victims.

Should anyone be interested in conducting future research in this area, we'd love to hear how you get on.

Coupland, S., Storey, J., Kropp, P.R. & Hart, S. (2022). Forecasting Stalking Recidivism Using the Guidelines for Stalking Assessment and Management (SAM). *Assessment*.

Doi: 10.1177/10731911221086050

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10731911221086050>

Tayebi, N. & Strand, S. (2022). Policing Stalking: The Relationship Between Police Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and Recidivism in Stalking Cases. *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management*. 9(3), 171-187

***Intimate partner violence***

As intimate partner violence is unfortunately always a topic that needs our attention, this is again represented in our annual conference program. This year various presentations will address this important subfield of expertise. We will have speakers from academic, corporate and law enforcement backgrounds who will share their perspectives on "Risk assessment, communication and management for both partners in cases of persistent intimate partner violence", "Threat management in a family office", a case study, and there is a strategy session to close the conference.

The academic world has also conducted some interesting new research in this area, including the following article from Sweden: *Vulnerability Factors among Women Victimized by Intimate Partner Violence and the Presence of Children*

This study aimed to a) examine the presence of children in relation to victim vulnerability factors and assess for intimate partner violence (IPV) re-victimization, and b) examine the police response, in terms of risk management, in IPV cases with and without children respectively. The presence of children is also a factor that can both enable and hinder the woman from leaving the violent relationship. In fact, the presence of extreme fear of the perpetrator may make a parent more likely to return to the perpetrator to avoid an escalation of violence. Thus, the IPV may be reported



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to the police with the aim of ending the violence, but does not necessarily mean that the victim can, or wants to, end the relationship. This explains why women with children also display a high prevalence of perceived inconsistent attitudes or behavior (56.2%).

The material consisted of 1407 risk assessments conducted by the police using the Swedish version of the Brief Spousal Assault Form for the Evaluation of Risk (B-SAFER) checklist, as well as recommended risk management strategies. It is important to note that these assessments are all interpretations of the trained police officer; thus, they reflect the perceived risk for violence and not the actual measured risk outcome. The intended purpose of identifying vulnerability factors using B-SAFER is to help the police determine the likelihood that the victim will engage in self-protective actions and, thus, adhere to the recommended risk management strategy (Kropp et al., 2010). In general, the results demonstrated a high prevalence of vulnerability factors among all women in the sample. Victim vulnerability factors that were most strongly associated with an elevated risk rating for IPV were generally the same for both groups of victims.

However, data analysis also revealed that women with and without children, respectively displayed different vulnerability factors to different extents. Women with children expressed more extreme fear of the perpetrator and were more likely to have an unsafe living situation, whereas women without children displayed more inconsistent attitudes or behaviours and health problems. Drawing on the increased likelihood of the co-occurrence of child abuse in relationships with IPV (e.g. Fernandez-González et al., 2018), it is possible that the fear expressed by women with children could be because her children were also victimized. Other studies also show that violent male partners often use children instrumentally, through custody disputes, to continue to abuse and control their former partner (e.g., Laing, 2017). However, there was no information available in this study in relation to how children who were present experienced violence.

Moreover, the study revealed that women without children were twice as likely as women with children to have been victimized by more severe forms of IPV. However, women with children were more likely to be assessed with an elevated risk for imminent re-victimization compared to women without children. This indicated that risk management decisions may to a greater extent be governed by the presence of children rather than reported violence severity. As such, the police were more likely to recommend more than standard levels of risk management strategies (i.e. restraining order and protection of victim's identity). In terms of assessed risk for severe or lethal violence, no significant difference was found.



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Joakim Petersson and Sara Thunberg (2022). Vulnerability Factors among Women Victimized by Intimate Partner Violence and the Presence of Children. *Journal of Family Violence* . 37:1057-1069 <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10896-022-00476-5>

**Threats to public figures**

Another returning field of application is threats to public figures. We are delighted that David James will be presenting his latest research in Nuremberg which looks at the importance of motivation and the purpose of threat when assessing the risk for subsequent approach. To give you a preview of the content of his talk, we recommend reading the following article:

*Threats to public figures and association with approach, as a proxy for violence: The importance of grievance*

The term grievance-fuelled violence reflects the fact that similarities exist between those committing violent acts in the context of grievance in different settings, so potentially allowing the application of insights gained in the study of one group to be applied to others. Whereas most studies on the making of threats and subsequent approach have been retrospective, this study of a sample of 126 threat assessment cases used a prospective methodology. It looked at the associations between the making of threats and subsequent approach from a different angle – that of a standardized and validated classification of underlying motivation (Warren et al., 2014). It found that particular types and forms of threat are significantly associated with subsequent approach in cases that are fuelled by grievance, but not in those where the motivation is to seek a relationship. These results refine our existing understanding of the significance of threats in public-facing cases.

The authors recommend examining as a first priority the underlying motivation, rather than the nature of the victim's employment. The issue concerning motivation, to put it at its most banal, is that those motivated by love are unlikely to behave in the same way as those motivated by hate. Furthermore, assessment should recognize that risk factors will differ according to the particular form of potential adverse outcome concerned. A third major element to consider is the question as to the immediate purpose of the threat to the threatener, or in other words the primary intention of the threatener to threaten.

David V. James, Frank R. Farham, Philip Allen, Ance Martinsone, Charlie Sneader and Andrew Wolfe Murray (2022). Threats to public figures and association with approach, as a proxy for violence: The importance of grievance. *Frontiers in Psychology*



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[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/364759806\\_Threats\\_to\\_public\\_figures\\_and\\_association\\_with\\_approach\\_as\\_a\\_proxy\\_for\\_violence\\_The\\_importance\\_of\\_grievance#fullTextFileContent](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/364759806_Threats_to_public_figures_and_association_with_approach_as_a_proxy_for_violence_The_importance_of_grievance#fullTextFileContent)

**Workplace violence**

Dantes Psychology owners Cornelis van Putten and Bram van der Meer published in ASIS International's 'Security Management' journal. Workplace violence training programs and approaches are not uncommon for companies in North America, but generally speaking, it is very new for European based organisations.

The authors have experienced that developing and setting up threat management programs in European organisations needs restructuring and reframing to make it more acceptable. They are discussing several themes emerging from their work in this field. One of these topics is that professional trainers teaching threat assessment in Europe should be aware that terminology associated with strong physical violence and criminal behavior does not sound appealing to the European corporate world. Also, Europe and the United States as societies strongly differ when it comes to a culture of litigation. There is no real imperative to introduce threat assessment and -management in Europe other than the conviction that the organization has a moral responsibility to protect employees. Furthermore, in Europe there is a strong movement embracing the protection of personal data and making it more difficult to find and use personal information of employees and students.

The article offers several starting points for experts who help implement threat management procedures in European organizations. Cornelis van Putten will elaborate on this topic in his presentation "Threat assessment and management in European organisations" next month in Nuremberg.

Cornelis van Putten and Bram B. van der Meer (2022). Translating Your Threat Assessment Approach. *ASIS International Security Management*

<https://www.asisonline.org/security-management-magazine/articles/2022/11/Translating-Your-Threat-Assessment-Approach/>


**INSTRUMENTS & TOOLS*****The Pyramid of Risk Factors towards an Act of Violence******A simple and pragmatic approach for structuring an initial screening***

The prevention of criminal offences, especially violent ones, has become a major priority for the judicial authorities in Switzerland in recent years. A number of cantons

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have introduced a threat assessment and management (TAM) unit or are in the process of setting up such structures within their police corps. Interdisciplinary cooperation is of paramount importance for the early detection of sensitive threat situations, the assessment of risk and the introduction of appropriate measures to defuse the potential for escalation. In view of the large number of threat situations reported to the police, the first step is to be able to identify those that require further assessment and those that require emergency intervention.

Initially, the *Risk Factor Pyramid towards an Act of Violence*<sup>1</sup> model was developed to rapidly enable police officers to make this initial screening. Hence, it is a compromise between up-to-date academic knowledge, the availability of information *in situ* and a deliberate limitation of the number of items. The choice of wording of the risk factors, their grouping and graphic presentation were aimed to be used by professionals that aren't necessarily TAM specialists. It serves as a pragmatic support in interviews with perpetrators or victims of threats. It enables the right questions to be asked and information to be gathered on the presence or absence of risk and protective factors. The tool helps to structure information about the potentially dangerous person, taking into account his or her personality, background, context, behaviours and events that may increase the risk of escalating violence.



The Risk Factor Pyramid is not a checklist in which a number of factors are counted to automatically indicate whether the person is dangerous, but rather an aid for gathering information, taking the necessary distance for holistic analysis of the situation and, if necessary, transmitting the right impulse to the TAM unit. The use of such a screening instrument complements the experience, intuition and common sense of the

<sup>1</sup> Jaccard, R. (2021). *Pyramide des facteurs de risque*. Manuel de formation continue. Éditions Institut Suisse de Police



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professional. More importantly, while it can be used as a first step to assess a situation, it does not replace a more in-depth assessment carried out by TAM professionals using scientifically validated SPJ instruments

In the meantime, the Risk Factor Pyramid has been widely taught and used in Switzerland by police forces, including

- TAM units of police forces for an initial screening to decide on further investigations requiring SPJ tools
- Senior officers and/or prosecutors required to take decisions under time pressure (e.g. restraining order, preventive detention, etc.)
- Psychosocial skills instructors in police academies
- Professionals of different state services (e.g. social services, debt collection office, women shelters, etc.), helping them decide whether to report a situation to the police TAM unit.

Based on its success, two additional variants of the Risk Factor Pyramid have been developed in the last two years: The *Domestic Violence First Responder Pyramid* and the *Crisis Negotiation Risk Factor Pyramid*. Interested AETAP-members will be able to access the three variants of the Risk Factor Pyramid in the upcoming new tools section of our web page.

Raoul Jaccard, AETAP board member.

**INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS & EDUCATION**

**The 4<sup>th</sup> international EFJCA-(European Family and Justice Center Alliance) conference**

Last June the European Family and Justice Center Alliance had his 4<sup>th</sup> international conference in Rotterdam. This time the conference theme was intimate terror, or in other words coercive control. Strategies, tools and products to build and support Family Justice Centers and related multidisciplinary approaches of gender-based violence, domestic violence and child abuse were shared.

Interesting and useful presentations for our practice of Threat Assessment and Management (TAM) were given about topics from different perspectives, such as: strangulation; legislation; risk communication as an essential part of multidisciplinary cooperation; multidisciplinary initiatives to tackle intimate terror; best practices to approach a victim; and the intimate partner homicide timeline (by Jane Monckton-





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Smith). 'Survivors' of intimate terror gave an extraordinary and valuable insight into their own experience.

All slides (PDF's) from the presenters are available at: <https://www.efjca.eu/news/fjc-news/report-4th-international-family-justice-center-conference>. If you would like to have a preview of the expertise of Dr. Anne Groenen, who will present at our 14<sup>th</sup> AETAP conference in Nuremberg, her valuable presentation on “recognition and acknowledgement of intimate terror” is also available to download using the above link. Factsheets about intimate terror and non-fatal strangulation are also freely available. Overall, a visit to their website ([www.efjca.eu](http://www.efjca.eu)) is a real pleasure for anyone who wants to know more about family violence, training, conferences and multidisciplinary cooperation worldwide.



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Lieke Bootsma, AETAP board member.